














The actual use of investigative 






Wilhelm Wundt originated systematic experimental psychological research and in 
1878 established the first Psychological Laboratory at the University of Leipzig. It 
was there that he and his colleagues initiated highly industrious research activities 
and within a short period of time they produced a host of publications.  
 
Two traditional academic professions closely observed the research findings of the 
new scientific discipline: psychiatrists, seeking to learn more about the functioning 
of the normal human mind and legal scholars, looking for psychological methods 
and techniques to identify the perpetrators of crimes under investigation.  
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At the turn of the 19th century, the Austrian legal scholar Hans Gross taught crimi-
nal law at the German University in Prague. He was especially interested in the 
most recent findings of the new discipline of physiological psychology. From time 
to time, he presented selections from psychological literature to his students. On 
one such occasion, he told them about Wilhelm Wundt’s experiments with the 
Word Association Test. One of his students, Max Wertheimer, became interested 
in the Word Association Test technique and envisaged that it had the potential to 
be a suitable tool to identify perpetrators of crimes under investigation. Fascinated 
by the success of his preliminary experiments with the Word Association Test, 
Wertheimer decided to change disciplines – from jurisprudence to psychology – 
and wrote his dissertation in Würzburg under Marbe on this topic (Wertheimer, 
1906).  
 
At the same time, the German-Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler demonstrated in-
terest in the Word Association Test, with his main concern being the question as to 
whether the associations of mentally ill persons differ in any way from the associa-
tions of mentally healthy persons. At that time, Carl Gustav Jung served as his 
senior assistant staff physician. Bleuler, as head of the prestigious psychiatric hos-
pital Burghoelzli (near Zurich), entrusted Jung with the research on this subject and 
in 1902 Jung performed six experimental studies on the Word Association Test that 
were published in journals from 1904 to 1910. Later, these works were published 
in English as volume 2 of Jung’s Collected Papers. Jung also developed the idea 
that this test could possibly be used for criminal investigations and he tested its 
applicability in two criminal cases. In both cases, the outcome of the Word Asso-
ciation Test was correct (Jung, 1973). 
 
Wertheimer and Jung simultaneously and independently developed the idea that 
the Word Association Test’s validity could be increased by the simultaneous re-
cording of involuntary peripheral physiological reactions. This was another conse-
quence of the impressive research that had been performed in Wilhelm Wundt’s 
laboratory at the end of the 19th century. 
 
After the early years of the 20th century, only occasional research was performed 
on the use of peripheral physiological reactions in the investigation of crimes. Oc-
casionally, an anecdotal article was published in a minor journal and the interest of 
police scientists and the legal community was very low. Eventually, this kind of 
investigative tool fell by the wayside.  
 
The story continues in the United States. How did scientists and police officers 
learn of an approach that had its origins in Germany and in the German-speaking 
part of Switzerland? 
 





William James, professor of psychology at Harvard, was an admirer of the German 
psychologist Hugo Münsterberg, who was Wundt’s student from 1882–1885. Wil-
liam James was so profoundly impressed with Münsterberg that he arranged to 
have him visit Harvard for three years (1892–1895), hoping that the appointment 
could be made permanent. Once in the United States, Münsterberg’s energetic 
mind moved at once from experimental to still newer psychologies. He broke 
ground in psychotherapeutics, forensic psychology, and industrial psychology. 
Edwin Boring praises him with the words: “In a sense he ‘founded’ applied psy-
chology” (p. 428).  
 
In 1908, Münsterberg published his book On the Witness Stand, in which he sum-
marised German research in the field of forensic psychology, especially with re-
gard to eye witness testimony and psychological methods of identifying perpetra-
tors. This book made German research findings known to the interested American 
public. Münsterberg advocated greater forensic attention to the techniques of ex-
perimental psychology.  
 
Among his students was William Marston, J. D., PhD, who developed a technique 
for use in actual criminal cases. Marston was an avid publicist and he either coined 
the misleading term “lie detector” himself or else adopted the expression from one 
of the journalists to whom he described the wonders of his technique. 
 
This term of course was a misnomer, as Martin Orne, born and raised in Germany 
and later – in order to save his life – emigrated to the United States, pointed out 
(1975): 
 
Not only are the physiological changes as such unrelated to lying, but it is 
not even the act of lying per se which brings them about. This observation 
can readily be documented in laboratory experiments (p. 95).  
 
The development of the instrument as well as the question technique rested for 
several decades in the hands of practitioners. 
 
After World War II, Germany was divided into four occupied zones. The Military 
Police of the US armed forces had “special agents” working as polygraph examin-
ers. A few of them were German refugees and thus German-speaking. In time, 
some German defence attorneys established contact with US military defence at-
torneys. During their conversations, German defence attorneys discovered that the 
military Criminal Investigation Department, as well as the military defence attor-
neys, asked suspects who denied charges brought against them to submit them-
selves to a polygraph test. In this manner the suspects had a chance to prove their 
innocence; many times the result was that the charges were dismissed. In some 




homicide cases, German defence attorneys advised their clients who pleaded not 
guilty to submit to a polygraph examination in order to disprove the charges 
brought against them. None of the German lower courts admitted polygraph evi-
dence. At least one German defence attorney appealed a lower court decision and 
took the case to the German Federal High Court. 
 
In 1954, this Court ruled (BGHSt 5, 332) that basic principles of German constitu-
tional law and criminal procedure prohibit the use of polygraph examinations be-
cause they encroach upon the freedom of the defendant to make decisions and act 
according to his own will. This freedom of the accused is based on the principles of 
constitutional law and criminal procedure, as well as upon the concept of an indi-
vidual’s self-accountable moral personality. Infringements upon the freedom of 
personal will are prohibited regardless of the accused person’s consent to their 
violation. It was this right of the accused to decide whether and how to answer 
every question that the Supreme Court held to be irreconcilable with the applica-
tion of a polygraph examination. The reasoning behind this decision held that dur-
ing a polygraph test, a guilty party may voluntarily answer questions.  
 
At the same time, however, his involuntary reactions when attached to the poly-
graph instrument would reveal the fact of his guilt and this information is actually 
obtained against his will. This insight into the accused’s soul violates his freedom 
of decision and action. Accordingly, polygraph examinations must be prohibited in 
criminal proceedings, as each individual has the right to retain an important and 
inviolate psychic sphere, which is necessary for the maintenance and development 
of personality. 
 
How did this decision come about? The first Senate of the Federal High Court of 
Germany had to decide upon the admissibility of an investigative procedure totally 
unknown to the justices. They had no idea about the details of the administration of 
a physiopsychological test designed to discover whether a suspect was in any way 
involved in the crime under investigation or adjudication. The justices felt that they 
needed information about this technique and its administration. Unfortunately, the 
Senate justices did not know who in Germany would be able to provide them with 
the information they needed. Therefore, they decided to ask the US Crime Labora-
tory for Europe, at that time stationed in Wiesbaden, whether they would delegate 
a German-speaking special agent to testify before the senate in order to inform the 
justices about the instrument and the administration of the entire examination. 
Naturally, the special agent was not and in fact could hardly be familiar with Ger-
man law; he only knew the American criminal justice system, which is an adver-
sarial system with lay jurors in which it is important for the parties “to impress the 
jury”. Having this in mind, the special agent tried to impress the justices of the 
Senate. Therefore, he decided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the technique by 
conducting a silent answer test. He selected a subject from the audience and di-




rected him to write a number from 2 to 6 inclusively on a piece of paper after the 
examiner averted his gaze. Next, the subject folded the paper and placed it into his 
pocket. The examiner then stated that he would ask about each of the five numbers 
several times, each time in a different sequence. The subject’s task was to listen to 
the questions, but to keep silent. Despite these measures, the examiner was able to 
discover which number the subject had written on the piece of paper. In this man-
ner, the special agent demonstrated to the justices that it was a rather easy task for 
him to find the number he had written on the piece of paper by inspecting the re-
corded involuntary reactions of the subject, even though the subject concealed the 
number he had written. The special agent believed that this demonstration would 
impress the justices. Instead, the five justices were startled by this demonstration 
because, in their minds, the special agent proved that this technique made it possi-
ble to access knowledge that the subject did not want to reveal. Thus, their lesson 
from this demonstration was that it was possible to obtain information from an 
individual against his will.  
 
As a consequence of this misunderstanding, the members of the senate concluded 
that they had to prohibit the use of this technique in criminal proceedings in order 
to protect the freedom of the defendant to make independent decisions and to act 
according to his own free will (BGHSt, 1999, 44, p. 308). 
 
After this decision was handed down, the discussion about the admissibility of 
results obtained by the administration of this technique ceased. The courts rejected 
all motions of the defence to admit the results of polygraph examinations. 
 
Matters began to change in 1979, when a law professor (J. Schwabe) published 
critical comments about the Supreme Court decision of 1954. The Supreme Court’s 
main argument was that the administration of the comparison question test violates 
human dignity and respect for human rights. This law professor raised the question 
whether it was not an even stronger violation of the dignity of the individual and of 
human rights to place an innocent person in jail than the administration of a physi-
cal and psychological examination that the defendant himself desperately wanted 
to undergo in order to prove his innocence (Schwabe, 1979). 
 
Of course, there is only one answer to this question. This article encouraged legal 
scholars to come forward with objections to the Supreme Court decision. Prior to 
that, I published a couple of articles in legal journals in which I attacked the Su-
preme Court decision, pointing out the Supreme Court’s misunderstanding of the 
rationale and the administration of the test under consideration (Undeutsch, 1975, 
1979, 1983 a & b). 
 
As a result, some judges and courts dared to admit the results of polygraph exami-
nations into evidence. Of course, these decisions were appealed by prosecutors. In 




this manner, these cases came back to the Supreme Court, which decided to issue a 
new policy decision in 1998 (BGHSt, 1999, 44, p. 308). The Supreme Court or-
dered a hearing and called four scientists to submit expert testimony on the validity 
of physiopsychological examinations, especially of the comparison question test. 
The hearing was scheduled for two days. On the first day, the experts presented 
their opinions.  
 
The first opinion was that of a professor of physiology. He pointed out that while 
he did not have detailed knowledge about the method under discussion, he ap-
pealed to his common sense: if the technique had an acceptable level of validity, it 
should be used. He compared it to acupuncture and explained to the Supreme 
Court: No one knows, why this practice works, but since it works it is used and 
should be used. 
 
Next it was my turn and the presiding justice gave me half an hour to render my 
opinion. I pleaded in favour of the admissibility of this technique, at least for those 
who maintain their innocence and desperately want to prove it (Undeutsch & 
Klein, 1999). 
 
The next expert was Max Steller, a professor of Forensic Psychology at the Free 
University of Berlin. Steller wrote in his Habilitationsschrift (1987) (a treatise 
submitted for recognition as a lecturer in psychology at German universities):  
 
As to the methodological aspect we can state, that ... the psychological as-
sessment of the veracity of witness statements is by far not as thoroughly 
scientifically scrutinised as psychophysiological methods (p. 166). 
 
Then, in court (1999) he testified to the effect that comparison question tests have 
a very low validity, especially when applied to probable sex offenders. This testi-
mony had very heavy impact on the court, because in court proceedings regarding 
child sexual abuse, we are frequently presented with a situation in which no physi-
cal or circumstantial evidence, nor testimony of a non-involved adult witnesses 
exist. This means that for innocent persons, the chances of disproving an allegation 
is extremely low. They therefore resort to a physiopsychological examination.  
 
The last expert was K. Fiedler, a clinical psychologist, who in his introductory 
remarks stressed the fact that he never had testified in court and that he had no 
interest in forensic psychology at all. In his testimony he pointed out that the theo-
retical basis of the comparison question test was extremely weak. As to the validity 
of this diagnostic tool, he claimed that the results of those examinations were more 
often wrong than they were correct. In the afternoon of the day of the hearing he 
presented to the court and his expert colleagues a table with figures about accuracy 




rates on both guilty and innocent subjects. This was a real surprise because his 
written testimony (1999) did not contain anything of the kind. 
 
Later, I discovered that he used figures from the Patrick and Iacono field validity 
study (1991). The authors evaluated comparison question polygraph tests per-
formed by examiners of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The original examin-
ers recorded and scored the subjects’ reactions . Later, independent examiners – 
who were also police examiners – did likewise. The independent police examiners 
had an exceptionally low hit rate. The fourth expert witness simply cited the hit 
rates of the independent examiners and based thereon, concluded that comparison 
question tests produce more false outcomes than correct ones. What he did not tell 
the court was that the: 
 
− original examiners were 94% correct in their decisions regarding guilty 
subjects and 100% correct on innocent subjects (1996),  
− independent evaluators in all other high quality field studies had very high 
accuracy rates (Honts, Raskin & Kircher, 2007), 
− sample of polygraph examinations suffers from criterion contamination 
since it included three completely different categories of examinees: sus-
pects, alleged victims, and other witnesses (Honts, 1996). 
− The figures used by the fourth expert witness are completely irrelevant for 
the courts because the court-appointed expert usually is the one who exam-
ines the witness or the accused and the one who issues a written report prior 
to the trial, either to the prosecuting attorney or to the court. 
− Patrick and Iacono study has been replicated by Charles Honts, also using 
material from the polygraph section of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
In Honts’ new study, the original examiners were correct with regard to in-
nocence in 100% of the cases and on the guilty persons in 94% of the cases. 
The independent examiners were correct on guilty persons in 100% of the 
cases, and on innocent suspects in 83%. Importantly, however, they were in-
correct in 0% of the cases; the remaining 17% were inconclusive (Honts, 
1996). 
 
The fourth expert did not reveal any of this to the court – presumably because he 
did not know better. While there is no reason to assume that he was dishonest to 
the court, the fact remains that he based his conclusions on the poorest of all high 
quality field validity studies. Honts, Rasking & Kircher (2007) write: 
 
Given the general performance of independent evaluators across these high 
quality field studies, it appears that the performance of the blind evaluators 
in Patrick and Iacono could be viewed as an outlying data point (p. 803). 
 
 





In 1998, the First Senate of the German Federal High Court handed down a policy 
decision stating that: 
 
1. All the judicial reasons given in the first decision in 1954 were untenable. 
2. The comparison question test had no evidentiary value whatsoever; there-
fore, it was inadmissible in criminal proceedings. 
 
This has been the state of affairs in Germany since 1998. 
 
Nevertheless, during the investigative phase of criminal proceedings, state attor-
neys refer their unresolved cases to physiopsychological experts in order to reduce 
the number of possible suspects or to find out whether the prime suspect is the 
perpetrator. 
 
More frequently, defence attorneys refer their clients professing innocence to ex-
perts in order to undergo a forensic psychophysiological examination. This is sim-
ply to know if the client is guilty or innocent, which is important information 
needed to prepare a proper defence strategy for the case at hand. 
 
If the outcome of the examination is that the client was truthful when denying the 
charges, we render a written report to the defence attorney, who then forwards the 
report to the court. 
 
If in custody and visitation cases the suspicion of child sexual abuse is brought, the 
accused fathers ask for a physiopsychological examination in order to prove their 
innocence. Family courts are more inclined than criminal courts to accept poly-
graph evidence because they are more anxious to protect children from giving oral 
testimony in court. 
 
On occasion, the police ask us to conduct a polygraph examination on suspects. 
 
In conclusion, I dare to predict that the German Federal High Court’s latest deci-
sion in this matter will not survive as long as the first one did (45 years). The sec-
ond decision rests on the assumption that physiopsychological examinations have 
no evidentiary value whatsoever. This assumption is that faced with relevant re-
search findings that strongly contradict the court decision (see the most recent sur-
vey by Honts, Raskin, Kircher, 2007), there is a high probability that before long 
the German Federal High Court will have to decide once again on the admissibility 
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